Nevertheless, such values are not ontologically objective, since they are grounded in the subjective desires of human beings. Rather, they are ontologically intersubjective because such values corresponds to the universal desires found in all human societies.
With this distinction in mind, let’s return to Ruse.
Fortunately for us, however, such passages are not hard to find. Clearly, here, the evolutionist and the Christian part company.
Admittedly, there is no unanimity among Christians as to the true foundations of morality.
The only alternative is for ethical statements to be correct objective claims, which entails moral realism.
Another way of categorizing meta-ethical theories distinguishes between monistic theories (in which there is one true, or at least one highest, good) and pluralistic theories.
For an example of an intersubjective foundation for moral values, consider Larry Arnhart’s recent defense of an Aristotelian ethical naturalism rooted in the biological nature of human beings. On Arnhart’s theory, some moral values have an ontological foundation in the biological nature of human beings.
Moreover, those moral values are epistemologically objective, since they are rooted in universal desires found in all human societies.
" Metaethics seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties and evaluations as such, and not just the content of particular norms or evaluations.
In addition to those given above, examples of metaethical questions include: A meta-ethical theory, unlike a normative ethical theory, does not contain any ethical evaluations.