The statement of legal obligations congruous with Kelsen's model of normativity was the cognitivist one, namely, that statements of legal obligation purport to state moral reasons for action.
The legal statements would be truth-apt in relation to such moral reasons.
Perhaps a little more needs to be said in defense of Kelsen's invocation as an exemplar of the impinging model before we proceed any further.
Roughly, Kelsen's Section II for discussion) as taking the place of the objective moral requirement in the standard impinging model and acting as the fount of normativity and moral bindingness. Norm-relativist statements are “normative” in the wide sense of “normative” but are distinct from moral statements.
This paper hypothesizes that the paradox Hart confesses to in Ch.
X of Essays on Bentham was the result of metaethical ambivalence.
The reading of Kelsen that presents his model of normativity along impinging lines was suggested by the Scandinavian Legal Realists (Karl Olivecrona and Alf Ross, in particular) and later endorsed by Joseph Raz. For a discussion of Toh's semantic project and an alternative “norm-relativist” reading of Hart's semantic project, .
The impinging elements in Hart's model will be seen to bear resemblance to those found in Kelsen's account, and the rule of recognition in its impinging avatar seems to operate just as the Kelsenian can be classified as norm-relativist, though he never used the label. Statements of legal obligation are ‘normative’ in that they convey what is ‘required’ by socially practised norm-relative standards, which for Hart, were , Richard Hare pointed out that not all uses of ‘normative’ expressions like ‘ought’ are moral. This follows from the so-called “standard picture of psychology,” endorsed by cognitivists and noncognitivists alike, which dichotomizes mental states into motivationally inert cognitive states (beliefs) and motivationally charged conative or noncognitive states (attitudes and sentiments).
However, the “source” of normativity Hart seemed keen to advance—he makes an “attitude” the source of normativity—was only congruous with the projectivist model.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Does this mean that the version of the rule of recognition that was not congruous with the impinging model was congruous with the projectivist model?